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1. Where Do We Stand? The Constitutionalization of the 
EU and the Europeanization of Constitutional Adjudication 
This special issue is one of the outcomes of the IACL 
Roundtable on “Constitutional Adjudication: Traditions and 
Horizon” organized at LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, on 5-6 May 2017 
and of the related workshop of young scholars selected through a 
call for papers. From these events it came out clearly that the 
Europeanization of constitutional adjudication is not only a matter 
of pure academic speculation. The concreteness of this 
transformation emerges in particular from the final special section 
of this special issue, where we have interviewed four judges of the 
Constitutional Court of Italy, guest speakers at the IACL 
Roundtable, about the impact of European law on their legal 
education, their academic career and – above all – their role as 
constitutional judges. Their answers emphasize different 
experiences and approaches to law, but are characterized by some 
recurrent golden thread: the importance of their transnational legal 
education, an ever growing sensitiveness to the impact of 
supranational law on the legal system, an openness towards the use 
of legal reasoning based on comparative law.  
However, the Europeanization of constitutional adjudication 
emerges from the pure observation of the case law of the Court 
these judges are member of. The Taricco saga, that has very recently 
witnessed a decisive development with the decision of the 
Constitutional Court no. 115/2018, is only the top of the iceberg: in 
their interviews, all judges make clear how the impact of European 
law plays a crucial role in the Court. “In a context that is 
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constitutionally interconnected it is no longer possible to play any 
game alone”, says Marta Cartabia. As Daria de Pretis explains, the 
interconnection may emerge in different manners. Common judges 
tend to refer to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
when they raise questions of constitutionality. The Constitutional 
Court itself abandoned its reluctance to submit references for 
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Finally, comparison with foreign case law is increasingly common 
in the legal reasoning of the Constitutional Court of Italy. This trend 
is even more telling, if we note, as Giuliano Amato suggests, that 
“constitutional courts may be considered the less Europeanized 
national institutions, especially if compared to governments, 
ordinary judges, independent authorities and now even 
parliaments”. And on the other hand, as Silvana Sciarra suggests, 
“constitutional courts must be independent – but not totally 
detached – from the perseverance of other institutions in bringing 
forward reforms”.  
What are the consequences of such an empirically found 
high level of Europeanization of the “most national institution” in 
terms of constitutionalization of the European Union and facing the 
tension between unity and pluralism? It is responsibility of the legal 
scholarship to try to systematize and conceptualize empirical 
evidences, as the Europeanization of constitutional adjudication 
may be considered an empirical evidence.  
The boundaries for the elaboration of this scholarly challenge 
are set by two introductory essays by Raffaele Bifulco and Nicola 
Lupo. In the first one, Bifulco tackles the questions of the 
Europeanization of constitutional adjudication by providing a 
critical assessment of the theories of constitutional pluralism in the 
European Union. Bifulco considers that these theories must be put 
in context. Their explanatory validity and normative underpinning 
could stand when the problem of sovereignty did not represent a 
challenge to the process of European integration. By contrast, in the 
light of the multiple crises that the European Union has suffered in 
the last few years and of the intergovernmental relations’ 
hegemony, the answer seems to come from the strengthening of the 
democratic principle in the Union rather than from the ordering of 
States and EU relationships through the paradigm of constitutional 
pluralism. 
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In the second introductory essay, Lupo invites to consider 
new perspectives in the mutual accommodation between the 
positions of the many actors that made up the composite system of 
constitutional review of legislation in Europe. In particular, Lupo 
claims that instead of framing the problem in terms of “who should 
speak last”, we should ask “who should speak first”. While the role 
of domestic legislatures in this framework cannot be neglected, 
their inertia and unconstitutional acts should be addressed by 
constitutional judges, as “tenants” of the first word in the interplay 
amongst national and European courts. Indeed, constitutional 
courts are in the best position to frame constitutionally sensitive 
questions through the preliminary reference mechanism to the 
Court of Justice in order to let the composite European Constitution 
work properly and to allow national constitutional identities to be 
effectively taken duly into account by the Court in Luxembourg. 
 
 
2. A Composite System of Constitutional Adjudication in 
Europe as a Way Forward 
In the light of the framework given by the two introductory 
essays, the contributions collected in this special issue analyze the 
process of constitutionalization of the European Union1, in constant 
tension between unity and pluralism2, through the prism of 
constitutional adjudication, intended as the function pursued by 
courts (both supreme and constitutional) of adjudicating 
fundamental rights and enforcing the separation of powers3. 
                                                 
1 There are different views as for the desirability of such a constitutionalisation. 
The development of a European Constitutional Law has been praised by many 
scholars, such as R. Schütze, European Constitutional Law (2012); others, instead 
have emphasised the limits of the process, for example explaining the EU 
legitimacy deficit with its overconstitutionalization, such as D. Grimm, The 
Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case, 21(4) Eur. L. J. 460 
(2015). Finally, there are also scholars who contest the constitutional nature of the 
EU as such, like P. L. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the 
Nation-State (2010). 
2 See D. Curtin, The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces, 
30 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 17 (1993). 
3 M. Rosenfeld, Constitutional Adjudication in Europe and the United States: 
Paradoxes and Contrasts, 2(2) ICON 633 (2004); J. Ferejohn and P. Pasquino, 
Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe, 82 Tex. L.R. 1671 (2004). 
FARAGUNA FASONE PICCIRILLI – EDITORIAL 
160 
 
The questions the special issue tries to answer are the 
following: given the intertwinement between the domestic and the 
supranational “constitutions”, is there a composite system of 
constitutional adjudication4? What is the role of national and 
supranational courts in this system in balancing unity and 
pluralism when adjudicating on rights and on the interinstitutional 
balance? In particular, was there any specific lesson taught by the 
Euro-crisis in this regard?  
The way in which we tackle these questions is sketching a 
new theoretical proposal of the emerging of a composite system of 
constitutional adjudication in the European Union. The essays of 
the special issue openly approach the question of the existence of a 
“system”. In the classic narrative constitutional adjudication is a 
necessary consequence of constitutionalism5. Our idea is flipping 
the coin: we do not assume constitutional adjudication as a 
necessary consequence of constitutionalism, but we assume 
constitutionalism as a necessary precondition of constitutional 
adjudication. In other words: constitutionalism may exist without 
constitutional adjudication, but constitutional adjudication may not 
exist without constitutionalism6.  
The scholarly attention in the field of public law mostly 
focused on the constitutional nature of the European Union (EU), 
either by investigating the processes of creation and transformation 
of the statehood or by delving into the parallelism with the 
constitutional structure of Member States. The structural 
relationship between the European and domestic legal orders 
played a prominent role in guiding the debate, with several iconic 
methodological approaches being proposed to develop a 
constitutional theory of the European integration. The mutual 
interaction between domestic and European legal orders has been 
                                                 
4 Drawing on the idea of “Composite European Constitution” devised by L.F.M. 
Besselink, A Composite European Constitution (2007). 
5 See the traditional narrative by H. Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der 
Staasgerichtbarkeit, in Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der deutschen 
Staatsrechtslehrer (1929), vol 5, 78 ff. and as reported in L. Vinx, Hans Kelsen’s Pure 
Theory of Law (2007). 
6 As proved also by the constitutional crisis taking place in some countries in 
Europe, for example in Poland, through the disempowerment of Constitutional 
Courts: see M. Granat, Constitutional judiciary in crisis: The case of Poland, in Z. 
Szente and F. Gárdos-Orosz (eds.), New Challenges to Constitutional Adjudication 
in Europe: A Comparative Perspective (2018). 
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seen as ‘contrapunctual’7, or based on a necessary constitutional 
tolerance8, or as a space of ‘constitutional interdependence’9. The 
layered structure and co-existence of national and supranational 
levels has been read as the premise for a multi-level 
constitutionalism10 or the creation of a ‘union of constitutions’11 or, 
in an even more integrated manner, as the source of a composite 
European constitution12, in which neither the supranational nor the 
national constitutional level can fully operate alone without the 
necessary completion of the other. Within this stream of 
scholarship, constitutional pluralism exercised a growing influence 
on the debate13. However, constitutional pluralism explores the 
source of constitutional authority, investigating and normatively 
enhancing heterarchical overlaps of state constitutional authorities 
and European constitutional authority as ultimately self-standing 
sources of authority.  
The special issue aims at investigating the functional exercise 
of constitutional adjudication within the European Union, 
exploring whether the fundamental rights review and the 
enforcement of the separation of powers are exercised in a 
composite manner between the EU and the Member States. This 
functional approach puts constitutional adjudication in front, 
aiming at investigating the centrality of the judicial driver in the 
making of European legal integration through a new prism. When 
the term pluralism is used in this context, it is not referred to in the 
sense of the “constitutional pluralism” theoretical account, but 
                                                 
7 M. P. Maduro, Contrapunctual law: Europe's constitutional pluralism in action, in 
N. Walker (ed.), Sovereignty in transitions (2006), 501. 
8 J.H.H. Weiler, In defence of the status quo: Europe’s constitutional sonderweg, in Id. 
and M. Wind (eds.), European Constitutionalism beyond the State (2003), 7-23. and 
Id., On the power of the Word: Europe’s constittutional iconography – Prologue, 3(2&3) 
ICON 173 (2005) 184-190. 
9 M. Cartabia, Europe as a Space of Constitutional Interdependence: New Questions 
about the Preliminary Ruling, 16(6) GLJ – Special Issue on “The preliminary 
references by Constitutional Courts to the CJEU” 1791 (2015). 
10 I. Pernice, Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union, 5 Eur. L. R. 511 
(2002). 
11 A. Manzella, La ripartizione di competenze tra Unione europea e Stati membri, 3 
Quad. Cost. 531 (2000) and, more recently, Id., L’unitarietà costituzionale 
dell’ordinamento europeo, 3 Quad. Cost. 659 (2012). 
12 L.F.M. Besselink, A Composite European Constitution, cit. at 3. 
13 See, lately, G. Davies and M. Abvelj (eds.), Research Handbook on Legal Pluralism 
and EU Law (2018). 
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rather to point out descriptively to a situation in which the 
understanding of Courts of a certain issue, their arguments and 
reasoning diverge among Member States as well as between a 
domestic court and the ECJ, in an attempt to find a problematic 
balance between uniformity and differentiation. 
In fact, it is well established that ordinary judges of the 
Member States, much less so Constitutional and Supreme Courts, 
benefited from a steady process of empowerment through their 
direct dialogue with the Court of Justice (ECJ)14. The judicial 
dialogue then acquired a prominent role in the literature, as the 
principal indicator of the increasing level of legal integration. 
Further studies explored the impact on constitutional courts15 
whose centrality in the domestic legal systems was eroded by this 
emerging network between ordinary and European judges16. As the 
right to the ultimate say of national constitutional courts was 
threatened by this process, they either directly challenged the 
authority of the Court of Justice (e.g. Czech Constitutional Court, 
Danish Supreme Court, Hungarian Constitutional Court) or tried 
to recover some role by joining the circuit of the judicial dialogue 
by means of preliminary references (Austrian, Belgian, French, 
Italian, Lithuanian, Polish, Slovenian, Spanish and, to a certain 
extent, German constitutional courts).  
Less attention has been devoted to the emergence of a proper 
system of constitutional adjudication, which connects the national 
and the supranational level. This special issue aims at contributing 
to fill this gap in the legal scholarship. The pivotal question on the 
constitutional nature of the EU will not be addressed through the 
lenses of either the existence of a true Constituent Power, or the 
long-debated democratic/technocratic nature of European 
authority, but from the functional perspective of constitutional 
adjudication as a device that aims to combine unity and pluralism 
in a “compound” system. From the theoretical framework of the 
‘composite European constitution’, the special issue tries to answer 
the fundamental question of whether there is a system of composite 
                                                 
14 A. Stone Sweet and T. Brunell, Constructing a Supranational Constitution, in A. 
Stone Sweet (ed.), The Judicial Construction of Europe (2004) 45, at p. 81 ff. 
15 According to the meaning given by V. Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts 
and Democratic Values: A European Perspective (2009). 
16 J. Komarék, The Place of Constitutional Courts in the EU, 9 EuConst. 3 (2013), at  
420. 
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constitutional adjudication in Europe. In other words, the 
constitutional problem of the EU will be tackled from a different 
and, hopefully, fruitful point of view: starting from the effects and, 
specifically, the functionality of a system able to adjudicate 
fundamental rights and freedoms to individuals and to protect 
separation of powers, it aims at giving robust evidences of the 
actual existence of a constitutional adjudication system, thus 
revealing a constitutional profile of the European legal area. 
 
 
3. The Structure of the Special Issue  
To do this, the special issue firstly explores the relationships 
between national constitutional judges and supranational courts, 
both the ECJ and the European Court of Human Rights, as grounds 
of cooperation, competition and sometimes of conflict. In the first 
section of the special issue, Paris deals with this issue from the 
perspective of EU Member States’ constitutional courts’ case law on 
the limits to the primacy of EU law. Through a comparative analysis 
the author shows that important similarities can be detected in this 
jurisprudence. Moreover, if constitutional review of EU law is 
performed by constitutional courts in a cooperative manner vis-à-
vis the ECJ and within certain boundaries as for the disapplication 
of EU law, it can even foster the creation of a European legal space 
where the protection of fundamental rights and of the rule of law 
across the Member States and in the EU is enhanced while national 
peculiarities are preserved. 
Alessia Cozzi’s essay deals with a hypothesis of silent 
coordination of the fora of constitutional adjudication. Cozzi 
investigates decisions of national supreme and constitutional courts 
that implicitly follow a previous European Court on Human Rights 
(ECtHR) judgment without explicitly referring to it. Her article 
aims at understanding in which cases this implicit coordination is 
performed and why national courts are reluctant to make this 
approach explicit, hiding a successful coordination and turning a 
battleground into a meeting ground without emphasizing this 
transformation. Finally, the third essay of the first section deals with 
the interesting case study of the Belgian Constitutional Court, 
placed in a comparative perspective. It raises a problem of general 
and systematic interest for the identification of a system of 
constitutional adjudication in the EU and the exploration of its 
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procedures and challenges. This case study is extremely promising, 
as little research has examined whether constitutional courts 
employ the same strategies applied domestically, when violations 
of European and international law occur through legislative 
omissions. Omissions may be an insidious battleground for 
national and supranational courts, and Verstraelen’s article 
demonstrates a versatile approach of Member States’ constitutional 
courts in order to accommodate the potential fragmentation of 
national judges’ responses with the need to ensure unity and 
uniformity of EU law.  
The second section of the special issue is devoted to test the 
model of the composite European constitutional adjudication 
under pressure. The Euro-crisis offered an ideal stress test. Whereas 
legal analysis on the constitutional dimensions of Euro-crisis 
abounded, some specific aspects of this picture were overlooked 
also in those jurisdictions where the Euro-crisis had a remarkable 
impact. A first underestimated aspect concerns the role played by 
lower courts, often contradicting supreme and European courts. 
Pavlidou’s article addresses this vastly overlooked aspect, by 
examining how domestic lowest courts in Greece safeguarded 
social rights by resorting to alternative constitutional sources and 
by indirectly enforcing constitutional provisions in order to 
constitutionalize social rights. Her essay juxtaposes this practice to 
the opposite interpretation of austerity measures by the European 
and Supreme Greek courts. In light of this, she analyzes the 
implications of this contradictory judicial review both in terms of 
the scope of social rights and conceptions of unity and diversity 
within the multiple levels of adjudication. Another vastly 
overlooked aspect in the Euro-crisis scholarship is the absence of 
preliminary references to the ECJ for the ‘harmonization’ of social 
rights adjudication stemming from the same supranational 
instruments. Constitutional courts were eager to solve cases by 
invoking solely their own constitutional interpretation and 
standards. Pierdominici’s article tries to fill this gap in the 
scholarship, questioning constitutional courts’ reluctant 
approaches toward preliminary references aimed at guaranteeing 
(European) standards of protection of social rights. Fasone’s essay 
is devoted to look at the impact of constitutional adjudication on 
Euro-crisis measures on the role of legislatures, in this critical 
conjunction, to ascertain whether common challenges to 
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representative democracy have led to unitary or plural (and 
divergent) judicial responses to the issues of Parliaments’ 
displacement in Euro-crisis procedures. In particular, the article 
investigates in this framework how constitutional courts have 
resorted to the argument of the national constitutional identity 
showing that, due to several circumstances, the protection of 
parliamentary powers and, ultimately, of the principle of 
representative democracy has been of little concern for most 
constitutional courts in such a critical juncture. 
After having tested current trends of constitutional 
adjudication on the battleground of Euro-crisis measures, the third 
section of the special issue explores possible procedures and 
remedies to settle emerging conflicts. In this section, Andrea 
Edenharter claims that in the long run, a legal reconciliation within 
the EU can only be achieved if national courts enjoy at least some 
discretion in cases in which EU law allows for the application of 
national fundamental rights, because otherwise, national 
constitutional courts might challenge the ECJ’s role as Supreme 
Court of the EU and thus damage the project of reconciliation as 
such. Edenharter’s essay deals with the core problem of the possible 
existence of a system of constitutional adjudication in the area of 
fundamental rights review. In this respect, her article analyses two 
possible legal tools that may facilitate the function of such a system 
of constitutional adjudication. On the one hand, the margin of 
appreciation doctrine developed by the ECHR should be adopted 
by the ECJ. On the other hand, the principle of discretion can also 
be applied in favor of the ECJ, with national constitutional courts 
reducing the intensity of scrutiny towards the ECJ in accordance 
with the German Federal Constitutional Court’s position in 
Honeywell.  
Zaccaroni’s paper deals with the need of reconciliation of 
Member States’ constitutional identities and EU law from a 
different perspective. His article holds this reconciliation as a 
necessary assumption to make a system of constitutional 
adjudication workable in the EU. The essay emphasizes the 
contribution of some recent decisions of the EU for the 
identification of the concept of EU constitutional identity. 
Zaccaroni’s aim is to assess how to reconcile the theoretical position 
of the ECJ with the one of the national constitutional courts, and in 
particular, the possibility to reconcile the pluralism of national 
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constitutional identities with the (desired) unity of the EU 
constitutional identity. His essay investigates two possible 
solutions: a) a clear theorization of an evolutionary interpretation of 
the principle of conferred powers; b) a real judicial cooperation 
between EU and national constitutional judges. In the latter 
perspective, Zaccaroni claims that constitutional courts should 
openly recognize the existence of an EU constitutional identity. 
Additionally, his essay claims that a system of constitutional 
adjudication would benefit from a mechanism of “reverse” 
preliminary ruling (from the ECJ to national constitutional courts), 
when identity-related conflicts are at stake. Finally, the last article 
of the section investigates the legal and practical obstacles to the full 
affirmation of the ECJ as a constitutional adjudication forum. 
Starting with the fact that the ECJ is increasingly emerging and self-
identifying as a constitutional Court, Carlo Tovo argues that the 
revision of the ECJ’s rules of procedure, along with the reform of 
the General Court, may play a major role in strengthening the 
constitutional adjudication of the Court’s activity. Tovo explores 
the new centrality of the preliminary ruling proceedings in the 
revised rules of procedure of the Court of Justice, in connection 
with the actual and future delimitation of jurisdiction between the 
ECJ and the General Court. Then, his article focuses on the 
procedural arrangements introduced by the revised ECJ Rules of 
procedures and other sources, aimed at balancing the need to 
ensure the coherence and uniformity of EU law and to strengthen 
the ‘constitutional authority’ of the Court. 
Before the special section on “The View from the Bench”, 
Gábor Halmai presents some conclusive remarks, providing a 
critical account of the use of the notion of constitutional identity by 
Member States’ Supreme and Constitutional courts. This is a key 
element to grasp the tension between unity and pluralism in the 
composite system of constitutional adjudication. Halmai argues 
that while a genuine reference to national identity claims is 
legitimate insofar as a fundamental national constitutional 
commitment is at stake, the abuse or misuse of constitutional 
identity by Constitutional courts “is nothing but constitutional 
parochialism” that can undermine the whole European 
constitutional construction and subvert the basic principle of 
sincere cooperation. 
